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Blunt the Violence: How Legal Marijuana
Regulation in the United States Can Help End the
Cartel Violence in Mexico
Andrés E. Muñoz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few people know of the fear and violence that currently plagues Mexico
better than Cristina Roman. When asked how the drug war violence in
Juarez, Mexico, invaded her own life, Ms. Roman responded, “How far
should I go back?” She began her account in May 2010 when, at four in the
morning, gunmen invaded her household, which included her husband and
three children.1 She hid with her children, but the gunmen ordered her to
come out and when she did, she was thrown to the floor as the men pistolwhipped her husband.2 They then asked for money, jewelry, and anything
else they wanted.3 After the gunmen told Ms. Roman to hide back with her
kids, they beat her husband for another 30 minutes. 4 After the beating
* Andrés E. Muñoz is a 2015 JD candidate from Seattle University School of Law. He
graduated from the University of Washington in 2012 with BAs in History and Latin
American & Caribbean Studies. He gives a special thanks to his friends, family,
professors, and Seattle Journal for Social Justice staff for inspiring him to write on this
important topic. He would especially like to thank Stacy Smith and Quinn Dennehy for
helping him polish this work to be ready for publication, Professor Bender for offering
his expertise and suggestions on this topic, and Leticia Hernandez, his partner, for always
being there to bounce ideas off of and for supporting him through the process of writing
this article.
1
Daniel Hernandez, Mexican Drug War’s Innocent Victims: ‘They Tried to Kill Me
With My Kids’, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2012, 10:34 EDT), http://www.theguardian.co
m/world/2012/aug/13/mexican-drug-war-innocent-victims.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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ceased, Ms. Roman came out to find that her husband was missing.5 Two
hours later, her brother-in-law received a phone call with ransom
instructions.6
Over the next two days, Ms. Roman and her brother-in-law sold her
husband’s used car dealership, liquidated his assets, and raised funds to pay
off the ransom.7 The kidnappers were supposed to return her husband on the
third day; rather, on the fourth day, they threw his dead body in the street.8
Sadly, Ms. Roman’s story does not end here. Overnight, she went from
being a stay-at-home mom to the sole breadwinner for the family with a job
at a nightclub. 9 While working one night, federal police entered the
nightclub, ordered everyone to line up against the wall, and searched for
weapons, violating women in the process.10 A few minutes later, the police
left and two men with automatic weapons entered and opened fire in the
club—killing everyone they could.11 Afterwards, the two men lit the place
on fire.12
Incredibly, Ms. Roman was able to escape the massacre, but the assassins
were still out to get her and the other survivors of the shooting.13 At one
point they even tried to run Ms. Roman off the freeway while she was
driving with her kids.14 Managing to escape that situation, she applied for
asylum in the United States.15

5
6
7
8
9
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Ms. Roman’s grim story gives one account of the atrocious and fearsome
violence that takes place on a daily basis in Mexico and that has been
occurring for at least the past eight years.16 The violence is part of a bloody
drug war that has taken place since 2006 between the Mexican government
and the powerful drug cartels that make enormous profits by trafficking
illegal drugs to the United States. These cartels make between $19–$29
billion annually, making drug trafficking one of the most lucrative
industries in Mexico. 17 It is estimated that over 70,000 people have died as
a result of the nine-plus years of conflict.18 This estimate does not include
the 40,000 US residents that die each year due to the illegal drug use that is
made possible by the cartels.19 In addition, according to one estimate, more
than 26,000 people have disappeared,20 a staggering number attributed to
both the cartels and to the Mexican government as part of its efforts to
combat the cartels through the use of violent tactics.21
The amount of illegal drug use in the United States is the driving force of
cartel power. In some respects, the United States is the perfect neighbor for
drug cartels because the country has a “high demand for drugs, a
sophisticated transportation network, a variety of places where drugs can be
16

Carrie F. Cordero, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: A Key Homeland Security
Challenge for the Next Four Years, 81 UMKC L. REV. 289, 292–94 (2012).
17
GRAYING G. WILLIAMS & JOHN MORTON, Joint Message from Assistant Secretary
John Morton, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Director Grayling G.
Williams, DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA–MEXICO: BI-NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDS
STUDY (2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/cps-study.pdf.
18
Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Cartel Leader’s Capture Will Have Little Effect on Drug
Flow, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/16/
world/la-fg-mexico-trevino-20130717.
19
See Cordero, supra note 16, at 289.
20
Catherine E. Shoichet, Mexico Reports More Than 26,000 Missing, CNN, http://www.
cnn.com/2013/02/26/world/americas/mexico-disappeared/index.html (last updated Feb.
27, 2013, 8:00 AM).
21
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: MEXICO 246 (2013), available at
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/mexico.
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grown and manufactured, a vulnerable southwest border, and a population
that is mostly unaware of the extent of the infestation.”22 How, then, can the
United States provide a means to an end of these dangerous cartels or a
means to completely dismantle cartel power? The goal of this paper is to
provide a possible answer to that question.
Understanding the drug war in Mexico is a complex study that requires a
strong historical grasp of drug trafficking in Mexico and an in-depth
analysis of how globalization, through neoliberal policies and ideologies,
has facilitated this violent war in Mexico. A well-rounded understanding of
the drug war is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, this article focuses
primarily on the cartels’ reliance on the illegal trafficking of marijuana to
the United States and draws on research to give a clearer understanding of
how marijuana impacts cartel business. Additionally, this article ties the
cartels’ marijuana business with the United States and the current
movement to legalize marijuana’s recreational use. This article explains
how marijuana legalization can potentially lead to a decrease in cartel
power and hence, a decrease in the violence that plagues Mexico. However,
the legalization of marijuana in the United States alone is not enough to put
a halt to the illegal trafficking of marijuana to the United States. This paper
argues that laws and policies legalizing marijuana need to be constructed in
ways that will drive drug cartels out of business, at least out of the
marijuana business.
Tight restrictions, high taxes, caps on marijuana (such as those in
Washington and Colorado), and state and federal conflicts limit the ability
for US businesses to grow and expand to an extent that could completely
replace marijuana provided by cartels. Like any business, the emerging
legal marijuana businesses must be able to compete with illegal marijuana

22

SYLVIA LONGMIRE, CARTEL: THE COMING INVASION OF MEXICO’S DRUG WARS 12
(2011).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Blunt the Violence 695

businesses in order to replace them. Displacing the cartel marijuana
businesses in the United States with legal domestic businesses would be a
huge loss to the cartels and would likely shrink their influence and
hopefully lead to an end of cartel violence. It is important that US policy
makers, voters, and residents consider what is going on in Mexico, because
this is a human rights issue that affects not only the United States’ next door
neighbor, but also US citizens and residents alike who have family, friends,
and loved ones victimized by the violence.
The topic of marijuana in the United States is the center of much debate
and controversy as there have been large movements in recent years to not
only decriminalize its use generally, but also specifically legalize its
recreational use. Currently in the United States, the movement to legalize
both the medical and recreational use of marijuana is gaining momentum as
can be seen by recent legislation legalizing the use of recreational marijuana
in Washington and Colorado in 2012, and Oregon, Alaska, and the District
of Columbia in 2014.23 This recent legislation is profound in US history
because a movement like this was likely unimaginable even 20 years ago.
This movement, however, is still young, and many states and the federal
government refuse to even consider this type of legislation for a variety of
reasons. Due to its current criminalized status in much of the country,
marijuana continues to be one of the most illegally smuggled drugs into the
United States from Mexico, which provides a strong economic base for
Mexican cartels.24
If more states, and possibly the federal government, followed in
Washington’s and Colorado’s footsteps by legalizing marijuana’s
recreational use, a dwindling of cartel funding and business would likely
23
Initiative 502 in Washington; Amendment 64 in Colorado; Measure 91 in Oregon,
Ballot Measure 2 in Alaska; Initiative 71 in the District of Columbia.
24
See CNN Library, Mexico Drug War Fast Facts, CNN WORLD, http://www.cnn.com/
2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/ (last updated Mar. 15, 2014 9:29
AM).
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result. This reduction of cartel power would severely damage cartels’ efforts
and possibly lead to an end of the widespread violence in Mexico. As stated
above, however, this can only happen if the laws legalizing marijuana can
effectively drive down cartel influence. This article examines how the
current laws in Washington and Colorado could drive out cartel business
and how a few modifications to state and federal policies can further reduce
cartel influence and violence. Although Oregon, Alaska, and the District of
Columbia have passed recreational marijuana laws, this article focuses
primarily on the Washington and Colorado laws because more research has
been done on these laws as they have been around longer.
This article is broken up into four main parts with Part I serving as the
introduction. Part II focuses on the drug war in Mexico, providing an
overview of how the drug war came to be through a brief look at the
economic and political climate that led to the current crisis. This is followed
by an examination of the current situation, looking at the current demand
for drugs in the United States that serves as the driving economic force for
cartels. Additionally, this section looks at the cartel power structures in
Mexico that compete directly against those of the Mexican government,
which leads to the violence. This section also looks at how the United
States, by providing military assistance to the Mexican government in
combination with lax US gun laws, has exacerbated the violence. Lastly,
this section looks at the bleak future of violence in Mexico.
Part III looks into the movement to legalize marijuana in the United
States. This section begins with a brief overview of marijuana’s historical
criminalization through the War on Drugs. This is followed by an analysis
of the reasons why Washington and Colorado legalized marijuana, by
looking at marijuana’s gradual decriminalization, the widespread popularity
of its medical use throughout the country, and the ways that the official and
popular opinions have drastically shifted over the years with regard to its
use.
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Part IV examines Washington’s Initiative 502 (I-502) and Colorado’s
Amendment 64 to see which parts of these laws could keep the cartels in
business through difficult licensing procedures, high taxes, and caps on
marijuana sales. Additionally, this section explains how the uncertainty
between conflicting state and federal laws serves as another obstacle for
emerging legal marijuana businesses. This section suggests that states
should loosen some of their licensing requirements, increase the number of
licenses granted, and lower the overall tax rate on marijuana. These changes
would allow legal marijuana business to be more competitive against the
cartels. This section also suggests that marijuana should be rescheduled
from its current status as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substance
Act, that an exemption should be created allowing for states that have
legalized marijuana to not be threatened by federal intervention, and that the
president should consider implementing executive orders to realize the
above suggestions.

II. THE PROBLEM IN MEXICO
The problem of violence in Mexico has placed the people of Mexico in a
state of fear and uncertainty. This section puts this bleak sentiment into
context by examining the historical and economic forces along with
militaristic policies of both the United States and Mexico that have created
a climate of violence.
A. Brief Background of the Political and Economic Climate Leading to the
Violence
Recent cartel violence in Mexico can be traced to the election of Vicente
Fox in 2000 under the National Action Party (PAN). This was a
monumental change in power because it represented the end of a 71-year
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reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),25 which developed a
reputation for corruption and authoritarianism. 26 However, the PRI also
developed a masterful hand in dealing with the existing cartels, often by
taking down a few token gangsters and taxing the rest, but allowing them to
operate nonetheless.27 The switch of power from the PRI to the PAN was
popular among Mexican voters as it brought hope that corruption would be
eradicated and that democracy would finally be practiced in Mexico.28
However, the newly elected political party did not have such a firm
handle on the cartels—leading to the first serious violent outbreak of war on
the Texas-Mexico border in 2004. 29 President Fox’s successor, Felipe
Calderón, who became president in 2006 under the same party, launched the
full-out drug war on the increasingly powerful criminal organizations
through force, 30 rather than address the situation through reforming
Mexico’s flawed enforcement agencies. 31 In the first four years of his
presidency, an estimated 34 thousand lives were lost. 32 The number of
public officials who died during this four-year period is significant,
amounting to over 25 hundred public officials including police officers,
soldiers, judges, mayors, and other federal officials.33 This fact reflects that

25

Taylor Morris, Mexico’s PRI: Repeating History or Looking Forward?, HARV. POL.
REV. (Sept. 1, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/world/mexicos-pri-repeatinghistory-or-looking-forward/.
26
IOAN GRILLO, EL NARCO: INSIDE MEXICO’S CRIMINAL INSURGENCY 10 (2011).
27
Id.
28
See id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY: KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND
DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” 4 (2011), available at http://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf.
32
GRILLO, supra note 26, at 10.
33
Id. at 11.
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much of the violence was due, in part, to a struggle for societal power in
cartel-ridden regions.34
Free trade policies also set the stage for cartel control to escalate in
Mexico. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represented
the formal breaking down of trade barriers between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico, allowing goods to flow through the countries without
any restrictions. 35 Although NAFTA may have furthered US business
interests, it also furthered illegitimate business interests, such as those of
drug cartels.36 One of its devastating effects on Mexico is that it left many
workers jobless because they could not compete with US producers and
earn a livable wage.37 The influx of US-grown agricultural products, which
are mass-produced and exported to Mexico, has flooded the Mexican
market, making US-grown goods cheaper than Mexican-grown goods38 sold
within Mexico.39 As a result, farmers—consisting of young men—are left
jobless, leading to more young men that are eager to make any sort of
living. These young men then become easy targets for cartels that are
34

Id.
Kimberly Amadeo, Advantages of NAFTA, ABOUTNEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://use
conomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/NAFTA_Advantage.htm.
36
Ryan Grim, NAFTA and the Drug Cartels: “A Deal Made in Narco Heaven,”
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryangrim/nafta-and-the-drug-cartel_b_223705.html.
37
See Gabrielle D. Schneck, A War on Civilians: Disaster Capitalism and the Drug War
in Mexico, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 927, 957–59 (2012).
38
One of the best examples of a Mexican agricultural industry that was devastated by
NAFTA is the corn industry. After the implementation of NAFTA, Mexican farmers that
lived off the corn they grew and sold locally were driven out of business when cheap
American corn from the United States flooded the Mexican market, selling at cheaper
prices. Laura Carlsen, Under NAFTA, Mexico Suffered, and the United States felt its
Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2013/11/24/what-weve-learned-from-nafta/under-nafta-mexico-suffered-and-the-unitedstates-felt-its-pain
39
See Susana G. Baumann, Mexican Farmers Affected By Agricultural Subsidies From
NAFTA, Other International Agreement, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2013, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/mexican-farmers-agricultural-subsidies_n_2457845.htm
l#slide=1627659.
35
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hungry for foot soldiers. Policies such as NAFTA help explain the major
role that the United States has played in setting the stage for the bloody
drug war.
B. The United States’ Role in the Violence in Mexico
In order to better understand why the legalization of marijuana in the
United States stands out as a viable solution to the violence in Mexico, one
ought to examine how current policies in the United States add to the
violence in Mexico. Without the demand in the United States for illegal
drugs, the military aid the United States currently provides to Mexico, and
the free flow of guns into Mexico from the United States, the widespread
violence would likely not exist.
1. Demand for Illegal Drugs in the United States Fuels Cartels
The driving force of cartel power is the demand for drugs in the United
States. People in the United States spend approximately $65 billion a year
on illegal drugs, and drug-related damages amount to about $110 billion per
year.40 A report by the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
published in 2012 stated that about 22.6 million people in the United States
over the age of 12 were illegal drug users, accounting for almost nine
percent of the population and representing the largest proportion in the past
decade.41 Of all illegal drugs used in the United States, marijuana places
first, representing over 60 percent of all illegal drug use with 17.4 million
users in 2010, followed by 7 million psychotherapeutic users, 1.5 million
cocaine users, 1.2 million hallucinogen users, 0.7 million inhalant users, and
40

Drug Demand Sparks Drug War Debate, ABC NEWS (March 16, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131177.
41
U.S. SENATE CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, 112TH CONG., REDUCING THE
U.S. DEMAND FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS 12 (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://www.fein
stein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=81b53476-64a3-4088-9bae-254a8
4b95ddb.
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0.2 million heroin users.42 Thus this article focuses on how current and upand-coming laws that legalize recreational marijuana can be tailored to
drive the cartels out of business.
The Senate Caucus also found that “[m]ost Americans are unaware of the
impact that illegal drug consumption has in fomenting violence in drug
trafficking countries in Latin America[,]” citing Mexico as an example.43
During her term as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stated that in the
United States, “[o]ur insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug
trade.”44 She also stated, “We know very well that the drug traffickers are
motivated by the demand for illegal drugs in the United States and that they
are armed by the transport of weapons from the United States.”45 Clinton’s
comments appear to be the first comments made by a public official of her
capacity that admitted that the United States is largely responsible for the
violence in Mexico. It is clear from the abovementioned statistics and the
statements made by Hillary Clinton that the enormous demand for illegal
drugs in the United States fuels Mexican drug cartels. Although most legal,
academic, and media sources differ as to how the drug problem in the
United States should be solved, it appears that most sources agree that it is a
problem that needs to be resolved, not just by tackling the drug abuse
problem in the United States, but also by ending the demand for drugs that
provide the cartels with a means to exist.

42

Id. at 13.
Id. at 7.
Mary Beth Sheridan, Clinton: U.S. Policies Failed, Fueled Mexico’s Drug War,
WASH. POST (March 26, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2009/03/25/AR2009032501034.html.
45
Jo Tuckman, Hilary Clinton Admits US Role in Mexico Drug Wars, THE GUARDIAN
(March 26, 2009, 5:39 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/26/mexicohillary-clinton-drugs-weapons.
43
44
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2. US Military Assistance Escalates Violence
Thus far, the United States’ strategy for helping Mexico tackle the cartel
problem has been a militaristic approach. The United States has recognized
a need to assist Mexico, but rather than spending resources to tackle the
problem of demand, the United States has allocated resources to battle the
cartels with violence by supplying military equipment to the Mexican
government.
The Mérida Initiative, also known as “Plan Mexico,” launched shortly
after President Calderón took office in Mexico to serve as a partnership
between the United States and Mexico to “fight organized crime and
associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of
law.”46 As part of the initiative, the US Congress appropriated $1.6 billion
to fund aircraft to be used by the Mexican military and to fund other
programs, including training for police and federal and state correctional
staff to combat drug cartels.47 The United States’ decision to send funds to
Mexico demonstrates that the US government has an interest in the
militarization of Mexico’s drug war and that the war is at least partly funded
by US taxpayers.48 The Mérida Initiative also helped add to the violence, as
Mexican security forces—which the Mérida Initiative greatly funds—are
known to commit human rights violations, including killings,
disappearances, and torture, in efforts to fight against cartels.49
Another example of how the United States’ efforts to provide military
assistance to combat cartels in Mexico has only resulted in more violence
can be seen by the rise of a cartel known as Los Zetas. This group
originated in the 1990s when the United States actually provided military
46

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF W. HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, THE MERIDA
INITIATIVE: EXPANDING THE U.S./MEXICO PARTNERSHIP (2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2012/187119.htm.
47
Id.
48
GRILLO, Supra, note 26, at 10.
49
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 246, 252.
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training to members of a Mexican Special Forces unit assigned to combat
the Gulf Cartel. 50 Some members defected to the Gulf Cartel, becoming
enforcers of the criminal organization, likely because the cartel offered
more money than the Mexican Special Forces provided. 51 In 2010, Los
Zetas split from the Gulf Cartel, sparking one of the most violent periods in
Mexico as Los Zetas fought for turf against the Gulf Cartel and their rival
Sinaloa Cartel 52 using military tactics learned through US training. Los
Zetas now control much of the region surrounding the Gulf of Mexico up
through Northern Mexico and are one of the most feared criminal
organizations in the world, known for committing some of the most heinous
crimes in the drug war.53
President Calderón publically recognized that the demand for drugs in the
United States has made the drug industry profitable and that the flow of
weapons from the United States into cartel hands has made the cartels
powerful.54 In response to the cartels’ constantly growing power, President
Calderón believed that a militaristic approach was the right one to take,
stating, “the government must act with the full force of the state against [the
cartels].”55 He also stated that although the rising death toll is “painful,”
there is “no alternative” to the military strategy he undertook as president.56
Unfortunately, that approach has proven to lead only to more violence.
50
Gordon Earle et al., The 6 Most Infamous Crimes Committed By Mexico’s Zetas
Cartel, GLOBAL POST (July 16, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/reg
ions/americas/mexico/130716/the-6-most-infamous-zetas-crimes-mexico-drug-war.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See Tracy Wilkinson, Leader of Zetas Drug Cartel Seized, Mexico Says, L.A. TIMES,
July 15, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/15/world/la-fg-mexicozetas-cartel-20130716.
54
GRILLO, supra note 26, at 933.
55
Stephen Sackur, ‘No Alternative’ to Mexico’s Drug War—Says Calderon, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 27, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9130155.stm
#map.
56
Id.
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3. United States’ Lax Gun Laws Arm Cartels
Due to the United States’ lax gun laws, as guaranteed by the Second
Amendment to the US Constitution, cartels are easily able to buy guns in
the United States and smuggle them across the border back into Mexico.57
Anyone who crosses the border knows that going into Mexico is extremely
easy, involving minimal inspection, if any. It does not help that, in 2004,
President George W. Bush overturned a ban on 19 different assault
weapons58 to which cartels now have easy access and that represent 60 to 65
percent of the guns confiscated by Mexican authorities.59
A top Mexican national security and criminal justice official stated, “the
significant rise in violence and the increase in the number of public officials
killed in Mexico coincides with lifting of the assault weapons ban.”60 Many
opposed to the violence in Mexico believe another effective strategy in
curbing the violence would be to change gun laws in the United States to
restrict access to guns. This presents another set of arguments that go
beyond the scope of this paper but add another element to this complicated
issue.
C. Mexico’s Current Situation
The United States’ demand for illegal drugs, military assistance, and lax
gun laws have thus empowered cartels and fueled the violent drug war in
Mexico. The result is a pattern of escalating violence between the Mexican
government and Mexican cartels, and a general climate of fear among
people living in Mexico.
57

The Causes of Mexico’s Drug Violence, THE CAUSAL TRUTH (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.thecasualtruth.com/story/causes-mexico’s-drug-violence.
58
Id.
59
Editorial Board, Lax U.S. Gun Laws Enable Killing in Mexico, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-04/opinions/35445090_1_assault-weap
ons-gun-show-loophole-illegal-guns.
60
Id.
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1. Military Successes Do Not Alleviate the Problem
Mexican military forces have had some success in taking down top cartel
leaders. For example, in July 2013 Mexican Naval Special Forces captured
the head of the Zetas cartel, Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, also known by
his alias, Z-40.61 Treviño’s capture represents the first major strike against
the cartels for Mexico’s newly elected President, Enrique Peña Nieto, who
probably hoped that this capture would raise his popularity among the
public and among skeptics who doubted his policy towards the drug war.62
Early in 2014, Mexican Naval Special Forces also captured Joaquin “El
Chapo” Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa cartel.63
US Attorney General Eric Holder called the arrest of “El Chapo” “a
landmark achievement, and a victory for the citizens of both Mexico and the
United States.” 64 Similarly, a government security affairs spokesman
commented that the capture of Treviño “will seriously complicate . . . the
ability of these groups . . . to exercise their criminal activities.”65 However,
others believe that eliminating individuals like Treviño and “El Chapo” will
make little progress toward ending the violence. As one expert said, “No
capture of an individual will have a great impact on drug trafficking nor
perhaps, sadly the violence.”66 Cartels have a long line of heirs ready to take
the place of fallen leaders.67 Experts also refer to cartels as a worm, “where
authorities can cut off pieces, but the worm lives.” 68 These descriptions
accurately describe the problem with confronting cartels through the use of
61

Wilkinson, supra note 18.
Id.
63
Ray Sanchez et al., After Years on the Run, Sinaloa Cartel Chief ‘El Chapo’ Guzman
Arrested, CNN, (Feb. 22, 2014, 11:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/22/world/amer
icas/mexico-cartel-chief-arrest/.
64
Id.
65
Wilkinson, supra, note 18.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
62
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militaristic approaches. Although there may be battles in which certain
military gains are made against the cartels, the cartels come back to
confront their enemies with more violent force, further creating a violent
atmosphere from which innocent bystanders in Mexico cannot escape.
2. Climate of Fear Persists
The cartels are also known to make theatrical displays of victims to
create fear and intimidation, often as a message to security forces and to
rival cartels. In March 2013 the bodies of seven men were arranged on lawn
chairs in the state of Michoacán, some with threat messages nailed to their
chests with ice picks.69 In May 2012 just across the US-Mexico border in
the city of Nuevo Laredo, the bodies of four men and five women were
found hanging off the side of the Colosio Bridge, 70 which was quite an
atrocious sight for any passerby. In the same incident, 14 headless bodies
were found in coolers in a van.71 Hangings, beheadings, and lacerating of
limbs are common actions cartel members take upon their victims. Live
beheadings conducted by cartels are common on the internet, which
contributes to the mass fear people have surrounding cartels. 72
Unfortunately, this grim atmosphere is all too common in Mexico,
presenting what many people view to be a fearsome and hopeless problem

69
Mexico’s Drug War: 7 Men Shot in Head Are Left in Plastic Chairs as 14 Killed
Across 2 States, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 25, 2013, 4:16 AM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/crime/14-killed-2-drug-plagued-mexican-states-article-1.1297760.
70
Tracy Connor, Mexico Drug Violence: 9 Hanged, 14 Decapitated in the Border City of
Nuevo Laredo, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 4, 2012, 10:22 PM), http://www.nydailynews.
com/news/world/mexico-drug-violence-9-hanged-14-decapitated-border-city-nuevolaredo-article-1.1072899.
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Will Grant, Facebook Beheading Video: Who Was Mexico’s Jane Doe? BBC.COM
(Nov. 3, 2013, 7:42 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24772724.
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that cannot be solved.73 However, there may be a solution that lies on the
side of the border that fuels this problem in the first place.

III. WASHINGTON’S AND COLORADO’S LAWS LEGALIZING
MARIJUANA
This section gives a brief overview of how, within a century, marijuana
has been converted from one of the most criminalized substances in the
United States to one that is now being legalized for recreational use.
A. Background on Marijuana Regulation
Marijuana is one of the most traditionally regulated drugs in the United
States. Its regulation arose largely as a backlash against African Americans
and Mexican laborers in the Southwest, who were largely viewed as lazy,
prone to crime, and of lesser intelligence.74 All these characteristics were,
and often still are, associated with marijuana use. In the South, marijuana
was scapegoated as causing African Americans to commit murder, rape, and
mayhem. 75 After the Mexican Revolution of 1910, a large number of
Mexican immigrants entered the United States; Caucasians feared these
Mexican immigrants and so tied them to marijuana use, which resulted in
anti-drug campaigns warning against the “Marijuana Menace.”76
Not surprisingly, state and local governments whose jurisdictions
contained areas with large Mexican populations were the first to spearhead
the criminalization of marijuana—starting with California, which prohibited
the sale and possession of marijuana in 1913, followed by the city of El
73

See Ashley Fantz, The Mexico Drug War: Bodies for Billions, CNN (Jan. 20, 2012
9:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/15/world/mexico-drug-war-essay/.
74
Steven W. Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State, Federal, and Hemispheric
Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 359, 361–62 (2013).
75
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76
Marijuana Timeline, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/
cron.html, (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
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Paso, Texas, which did the same in 1914.77 The Great Depression of the
1930s caused massive unemployment, which resulted in resentment towards
Mexican immigrants among US citizens.78 The Great Depression also led to
more public and governmental concern over marijuana. 79 By 1931,
marijuana was outlawed in 29 states,80 with all states banning its use by
1937.81
In 1932, the federal government followed the states’ lead by introducing
the Uniform State Narcotic Act, which, rather than promoting federal
legislation, encouraged state governments to adopt the Act to boost the
uniformity and strength of policing narcotics, including marijuana. 82 In
1937, Congress officially criminalized marijuana with the Marijuana Tax
Act, which created an excise tax on its use. 83 Stricter federal sentencing
laws in the 1950s84 set mandatory sentencing for drug-related offenses and
included a minimum sentence of two to 10 years, with a fine of up to
$20,000 for a first-time offense for marijuana possession. 85 The 1960s
proved that these sentencing laws did nothing to eliminate the drug culture,
including widespread use of marijuana during this period, as it was known
for youthful rebellion and social change.86 This popularity led to backlash
from the Nixon administration when President Richard Nixon declared a
“War on Drugs,”87 calling drug use “public enemy number one.”88
77
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The Federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 classified marijuana as a
first-tier Schedule I controlled substance, placing it in the same level as
heroin and ecstasy, and above drugs such as opium, oxycodone, and
methamphetamine. 89 President
Nixon
ignored
and
rejected
recommendations by a committee he appointed to decriminalize its
possession and distribution for personal use, and the drug remains in the
Schedule I category to this day. 90 11 states, however, decriminalized
marijuana possession during the period between 1973 and 1977.91 This was
followed by the 1977 presidential election of Jimmy Carter, who won on a
platform that included the decriminalization of marijuana.92
After President Reagan took office in 1981, gains made to decriminalize
marijuana ended when President Reagan continued the movement of
criminalizing marijuana, as evidenced by high rates of incarceration during
his presidency. Thanks to the help of the “War on Drugs,” the United States
now holds 25 percent of the world’s prison population, even though it only
contains five percent of the world’s total population, making it the world’s
biggest jailer.93 In 1986, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
which raised federal penalties for marijuana possession and dealing,
eventually requiring life sentences for repeat drug offenders and the death
penalty for kingpins.94
88

Bender, supra, note 74, at 366.
Office of Diversion Control, List of Controlled Substances, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN., http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
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The Prison Crisis, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/safe-communities-fair-sentences/pris
on-crisis (last visited Dec. 1, 2013 at 10:50 PM); Kathleen Miles, Just How Much The
War On Drugs Impacts Our Overcrowded Prisons, In One Chart,
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
03/10/war-on-drugs-prisons-infographic_n_4914884.html.
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On the Mexican side of the border, the criminalization of marijuana in the
United States creates a demand for the drug through illegal means. Hence,
marijuana provides business for criminal insurgent groups like the cartels.
On the US side, the criminalization of marijuana contributes to mass
incarceration, hinders opportunities of individuals, and disproportionally
affects communities of color. 95 In recent years, however, opinions
surrounding marijuana use have changed, as can be seen by the large
number of states that have decriminalized it and legalized its medical and
even recreational use, particularly in the states of Washington and
Colorado.
B. Shifting Marijuana Policy: Why Washington and Colorado Legalized
Marijuana
In the 1960s and 1970s, marijuana use in the United States became less
associated solely with African Americans and Mexican laborers, and
became more widespread among the white population.96 By 2009, almost
half of high school seniors in the United States and 100 million US
residents had smoked marijuana, with widespread use among middle-class
whites. 97 Marijuana’s increased popularity among middle-class white
individuals in the past half-century has led to its increased
decriminalization. While the federal government’s marijuana policy has

In what’s known as the 100-to-1 rule, federal law mandates a 10-year sentence
for anyone caught with 50 grams of crack, about the weight of a candy bar. To
get a comparable sentence, a dealer selling powdered cocaine would have to be
caught with 5,000 grams, enough to fill a briefcase.
100-to-1 Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/
opinion/15thu3.html?_r=0.
95
See Michelle Alexander, The War on Drugs and the New Jim Crow, 17 RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE ENVIRON., A J. FOR SOC. AND ENVIRONM’L. JUST., no.1 (2010),
available at http://reimaginerpe.org/20years/alexander.
96
Bender, supra note 74, at 368–69.
97
Id. at 369.
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remained the same, states have taken the lead to decriminalize marijuana. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, states began decriminalizing marijuana by
reducing penalties for small possessions from felonies to misdemeanors.98
1. Widespread State Medical Marijuana Laws
One of the clearest signs of the decriminalization of marijuana and
increase in marijuana tolerance, is its widespread legalized medical use
among states. Marijuana is known to be an effective treatment for
symptoms of cancer, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, glaucoma, and epilepsy.99 It
is also known to effectively treat anorexia, spasticity, and migraines. 100
Marijuana is also used for pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and
appetite stimulation.101 A strong and early example of marijuana’s medical
potential can been seen by the federal government’s Marijuana Tax Act of
1937, which actually allowed doctors to prescribe marijuana for certain
medical conditions. 102 This recognition of marijuana’s medical potential
was, of course, done away with when the federal government designated
marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance in 1970. 103 Since then,
however, marijuana’s medical potential has been alluded to in various
reports and experiments.104
California became the first state to legalize the medical use of marijuana
in 1996, when voters enacted Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act,
with a majority vote of 56 percent.105 Since then, 18 states and the District
of Columbia have followed California’s lead in legalizing the medical use
98
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of marijuana, mostly through voter initiatives rather than legislation, and
requiring patients to obtain a physician’s recommendation to use marijuana
that can be home grown or purchased at dispensaries. 106 The movement
towards legalizing medical marijuana since the 1990s represents a large
shift in mainstream public opinion regarding its use because a movement to
legalize marijuana would have been unimaginable just a generation earlier.
2. Shift in Opinions Regarding Marijuana Use and Law Enforcement at
the Public Official Level
Another example of the rapid shift of marijuana policy is how public
officials have responded to questions regarding their own marijuana use. In
1992, when asked whether he had smoked marijuana, President Bill Clinton
admitted that he had experimented with marijuana a time or two and said
that he “didn’t like it, didn’t inhale, and never tried it again.”107 It is not
surprising that Clinton phrased his answer in this way because, at the time,
marijuana use still carried a strong stigma and because the Clinton
Administration took a hard stance against marijuana use. 108 President
Barack Obama, in contrast, mentioned in 2006, “When I was a kid, I
inhaled frequently. That was the point.”109 These two contrasting statements
reflect how opinions regarding marijuana use have changed in the span of
less than 15 years.
Recently, officials have made efforts to reduce penalties for marijuana
use, possession, and distribution. Although distribution of medical
marijuana is a still a federal offense, in October 2009 the Department of
106
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OF EDUCATION, STANFORD (May 15, 2012), https://www.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgibin/wordpress/2012/05/medical-marijuana-policy-in-the-united-states/.
109
2013 Top 50 Most influential Marijuana Users, supra note 107.
107

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Blunt the Violence 713

Justice (DOJ), headed by Attorney General Holder, sent a memo to federal
prosecutors to encourage them to refrain from prosecuting people who
distribute medical marijuana in accordance with state law, 110 further
evidencing that, even at the highest level of law enforcement, the nation is
taking a step back with regard to enforcing federal law regarding marijuana
usage.
In 2007, prior to the legalization of recreational marijuana use in
Colorado, voters in Denver approved an initiative that deemed marijuana
the city police’s lowest priority. 111 Similarly, in 2012, the Seattle City
Attorney announced that enforcement of laws pertaining to marijuana
possession was the lowest priority of the Seattle City Attorney’s Office
Criminal Division and Seattle Police Department, stating, “I don’t prosecute
simple marijuana possession cases.”112
3. Shift in Popular Opinion on Marijuana
For the first time in more than 40 years since this issue was first polled,
US residents favor legalizing marijuana usage.113 A national survey found
that 52 percent support the legalization of marijuana while 45 percent do
not, an increase of 11 percentage points since 2010.114 This shift in popular
opinion regarding marijuana marks a substantial change from 1969, when
just 12 percent were in favor of its legalization and 84 percent were
opposed.115 Young voters—those born since 1980, now between the ages of
18 and 34—are the strongest group in favor of its legalization with 65
110
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percent in favor,116 reflecting that in the coming years, as younger voters
increase in voting turnout, the issue of marijuana legalization will likely
shift more rapidly in favor of its legalization. All age groups polled are now
more in favor of marijuana’s legalization than ever before, including
Generation X with 54 percent, the Baby Boomers with 50 percent, and the
Silent Generation with 32 percent.117
The shift in public opinion on marijuana has been so significant that
recreational marijuana is now legal in four states and the District of
Columbia. Washington and Colorado captured national attention in the
2012 election by legalizing recreational marijuana use. 118 Voters in
Washington approved I-502 by 55.7 percent,119 legalizing possession of up
to one ounce of loose leaf marijuana, 16 ounces of a solid product, and 72
ounces of marijuana infused liquid for adults aged 21 and over.120 Likewise,
55 percent of Colorado voters approved Amendment 64, the Regulate
Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of 2012, legalizing possession of up to one
ounce of marijuana and the cultivation of up to six cannabis plants.121
Because the legislation of legalized marijuana is new, states like
Washington and Colorado face the problem of having no clear model for
legislation, leaving states with the ongoing task of testing which methods
will work and which will not. The next section will discuss what holes
legislation in Washington and Colorado may have left for cartels to fill in
and possible solutions to these problems in more detail.
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IV. CLEARING THE SMOKE: CRAFTING MARIJUANA LEGISLATION TO
TAKE OUT THE CARTELS
States around the nation are watching how Washington and Colorado
regulate the use of marijuana. In particular, California, a state that has been
central to marijuana policy in the nation, is watching closely how the
aforementioned states go about legislating marijuana. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) announced a panel, headed by Lieutenant
Governor Gavin Newsom of California, established to draft a possible ballot
item for 2016 to legalize marijuana in California. 122 As more states and
countries consider legalizing marijuana, the more they must consider the
implications of their legislation on the drug war in Mexico. The following
section examines how the current legislation in Washington and Colorado,
as it currently exists, might have little influence to hamper cartels, followed
by possible solutions to this problem.
A. Licensing Obstacles
One of the largest obstacles in running a legal recreational marijuana
business is obtaining a license. Merging licensing requirements between
medical and recreational dispensaries, loosening the initial requirements for
licensee hopefuls, and increasing the number of licenses issued will likely
contribute to a decrease in black market marijuana business. Although this
section focuses primarily on Washington law, Colorado has similar
licensing regulations. Under Washington’s I-502, there are three separate
tiers for individuals involved in the recreational sale of marijuana:
producer, processor, and retailer.123 Each must be licensed under the rules
122
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marijuana/faqs_i-502 (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
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set out by the Washington State Liquor Control Board. 124 Each license
application fee is $250 and each renewal fee is $1,000.125 Though a licensed
producer may additionally hold a processor license, neither a producer nor a
processor may hold a retailer license.126 Each applicant must go through a
thorough criminal background check and must pay for fingerprinting fees
(along with other background check fees), which are submitted to the
Washington State Patrol and FBI for comparison to the applicant’s criminal
records. 127 Financers are also subject to criminal investigation and the
Liquor Control Board conducts financial investigations to verify that the
source of funds are used for the “acquisition and startup of the business, the
applicants’ right to the real and personal property, and to verify the true
party(ies) of interest.”128
Additionally, applicants must also submit operating plans, must notify the
board of any substantial change to the plans, and must be current on tax
obligations in Washington. 129 Applicants must also have resided in
Washington State for at least three months prior to submitting an
application. 130 Although there are many good reasons for having this
requirement, applicants for black market marijuana businesses connected to
Mexican cartels certainly do not have to go through these tedious
background checks to enter into the business.
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In addition, limits on the numbers of licenses issued and restrictions on
retail location and advertisement hinder the growth of recreational
marijuana businesses. The number of retail licenses is limited and is
determined by using a formula that distributes the number of locations
according to the local population.131 Retailers cannot be setup within 1,000
feet of an elementary or secondary school playground, recreation center,
child care center, public park, public transit center, or arcade where minors
are allowed to enter; and are only allowed to sell marijuana, marijuanainfused products, and marijuana paraphernalia.132 Retailer licenses will not
be approved for locations within another business. 133 In terms of
advertising, retailers cannot have more than one 1,600 square inch sign
bearing the business’s name, cannot display products on window fronts, and
cannot advertise within 1,000 feet of the locations listed above where
retailers cannot set up stores.134
The process to convert a medical marijuana outlet into a recreational
marijuana outlet seems overly complicated considering medical marijuana
outlets are already heavily regulated. Medical marijuana outlets that want to
become recreational outlets still have to go through the same application
process as any other potential applicants.135 Should they obtain a license,
these stores would only be allowed to sell marijuana purchased from the
legal recreation system and cannot mingle medical and recreational
marijuana.136
Finally, applicants cannot actually get their license until after a final
inspection, after they have invested hundreds of thousands of dollars on
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equipment, 137 transformers, and leases, posing a “cart-before-the-horse”
kind of situation considering someone who does all this may not know
whether or not they will get a license.138
Since black market marijuana businesses do not face these regulatory
obstacles, states considering marijuana legalization may want to loosen
regulations to help neutralize this advantage. Particularly, it seems
counterproductive to require already existing medical marijuana
dispensaries in Washington State to go through the process of obtaining a
license through the same set of requirements as someone who is not already
licensed to sell medical marijuana. One of the reasons this requirement
exists is because, in Washington, the Washington State Liquor Control
Board governs recreational marijuana whereas medical marijuana is
governed by the Department of Health.139 If the two were to merge certain
requirements so as to not recreate the wheel, it would allow for easier access
into both markets for those looking to be involved in selling both medical
and recreational marijuana.
Easier access to licenses is essential for individuals looking to be
involved in the legal marijuana business and hence to compete more
effectively against cartel businesses. Another possible solution for this may
be to increase the number of licenses. There are 334 spots available for
2,000 applicants, and in the City of Seattle, there are 411 retail hopefuls for

137
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just 21 spots. 140 This 10–17 percent chance of approval causes a lot of
uncertainty for those seeking licenses. Certainty for licensing applicants is
important considering the commitments and investments that must be made
by potential applicants. For example, those seeking a retail license must
have a space leased as part of their application requirement.141 To make
initial investments in space and materials less risky, perhaps the application
requirements can have some preliminary requirements that allow for people
to, after passing the initial stage of their application process, move along
and invest more with the guarantee that their investments will not go to
waste. For example, uncertainty could be decreased if applicants are
required to have a business space leased and ready to go, but are not
required to invest in expensive equipment until after they are guaranteed a
license.
Also, the number of licenses should be increased to almost double, at
around 600 licenses, to allow for more people seeking to enter the
marijuana business do so. This number will allow for almost double the
amount of licenses while keeping it at a limit, as skeptics will likely not be
on board with issuing an unlimited number of licenses.
It is important to relax the process of granting marijuana licenses. If
current regulations prevent legal marijuana businesses from increasing and
eventually replacing black market businesses, then a black market will still
exist in Washington and Colorado and will keep cartels alive. The next
issue that may prevent legal marijuana businesses from replacing black
market businesses is the issue of whether legal marijuana can be sold at
competitive prices with black market marijuana. That depends on tax.
140
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B. High Taxes and Caps on the Amounts to Be Sold
Beyond licensing obstacles, high taxes and caps on amounts sold also
limit the legal marijuana market. One of the selling points on legalizing
marijuana is the potential gain to be made on its taxation. Consumers spend
an estimated $30 billion dollars per year on marijuana nationally. 142 In
Washington, state budget officials estimate that Washington could
potentially gain $134 million in tax revenue between 2015 and 2017. 143
Washington imposes a “25 percent tax on each of the three parts of
marijuana production: producer to processor, processor to retailer, and
retailer to customer,”144 consisting of a 10 percent sales tax and a 15 percent
excise tax. 145 In Colorado, marijuana is subject to a 2.9 percent sales tax, a
10 percent state tax on marijuana sales, and a 15 percent excise tax, with a
total 29 percent tax rate.146
Experts say that finding the “sweet spot” for taxation is key because
legalized marijuana needs to be competitive with illegal marijuana so as not
to push business back into the black market.147 These taxes have made it so
that the cost per ounce of high-grade marijuana from retailors is more than
double the cost from illegal drug dealers.148 The price for an ounce of highgrade marijuana sold legally in Colorado goes for about $400,149 whereas in
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the black market, high-grade marijuana goes for about $237 in Colorado.150
Additionally, visitors to Colorado can only buy a quarter of an ounce and
private citizens are limited to growing six plants. 151 In Washington,
changing the high tax rate would have to come through the legislature and,
during the first two years of the initiative, would require a two-thirds
majority.152
Washington has also placed a cap on the Washington market as to the
amount of marijuana to be produced at 80 metric tons: 40 for useable
marijuana and 40 for other marijuana products.153 This cap is in place for
several reasons. The main reasoning is to avoid having a surplus of
marijuana that can be illegally smuggled into other states—a major concern
of the federal government.154 Another reason for placing a cap is because,
when too much marijuana floods the market, retailers tend to keep prices
low, incentivizing them to disregard certain quality and safety measures.155
On the other hand, there are also arguments against imposing caps on the
retail marijuana market. Critics on cap placement argue that “by limiting the
legal market, they are enriching the illegal market.” 156 Any marijuana
provided to other states will likely come from cartels, keeping them in
business and keeping the violence in Mexico alive. Experts also say that
marijuana consumption in 2013 was greater than 85 metric tons, though
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because of the difficulty in measuring consumption, that estimate is likely
an understatement of actual consumption.157
States implementing marijuana legislation may want to consider lowering
taxes and eliminating caps on amounts sold because of the challenge they
pose for legal marijuana businesses and the advantage they give to their
illegal counterparts. One way to provide lower prices for marijuana would
be to lower the taxes on marijuana. A tax lower than 25–30 percent is a
possible solution that would significantly reduce the price of marijuana and
would incentivize potential marijuana buyers to purchase legal marijuana
rather than illegal marijuana. Potential losses in state revenue from reduced
taxes could be alleviated with an elimination of caps on amounts sold, or at
least an increase on existing caps. The increase in sales as a result of the
increase or removal of caps will result in more tax revenue overall.
Opponents argue that the removal or liberalization of caps may allow for
illegal interstate smuggling of marijuana. Though this may be true, some
might agree that it is better for marijuana to be illegally smuggled into states
where it is illegal from legal growers in Washington or Colorado than from
black market sources stemming from Mexican cartels, as these types of
transactions will not likely lead to the amount of violence seen in Mexico’s
Drug War. It is also possible that as time passes, and if more states legalize
marijuana use, competition from other legalized states may reduce the
amount of tax Washington and Colorado put on their marijuana.158 Only
time will tell.
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With an industry this young, it is difficult to tell what will happen with
regard to how regulations such as licensing and taxes will pan out. Another
interesting area to look out for is how state law regarding marijuana will
interact with federal law.
C. Federal Involvement
In addition to the obstacles marijuana businesses face at the state level
are the uncertain risks of federal intervention in the marijuana business as
marijuana is still illegal under federal law. 159 Individuals may still be
prosecuted if the federal government chooses to do so, 160 as federal law
preempts the laws in Washington and Colorado. The US Supreme Court
decision in Gonzales v. Raich held that the federal government could still
criminalize the manufacture, distribution, or possession of medical
marijuana even when individual states have legalized its medical use. 161
This holding applies to Washington and Colorado for legal recreational use,
creating uncertainty as to how federal enforcement will approach these
measures.162 After the passage of the laws in Washington and Colorado, the
DOJ released a statement saying that the laws would have no effect on the
federal ban on marijuana and that marijuana would still remain a Schedule I
controlled substance.163
At the same time, the Obama administration has stated that it will not
challenge Washington’s and Colorado’s laws so long as those states abide
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by the federal rule involving the sale and distribution of marijuana.164 When
asked by Barbara Walters whether the laws were a major concern of his
administration, President Obama responded, “We’ve got bigger fish to fry,”
and added, “It would not make sense for us to see a top priority as going
after recreational users in states that have determined that it’s legal.”165 In
August 2013 Deputy Attorney General James Cole released a memo
encouraging US attorneys to use prosecutorial discretion in enforcing
priorities, noting that marijuana-related activity in compliance with
Washington and Colorado laws is less likely to threaten the DOJ’s
objectives. 166 However, the memo also asserted the power of federal
prosecutors to enforce the federal law in Washington and Colorado,
including those acting in compliance with the states’ recreational use
laws.167
The mixed signals from the Obama Administration and the DOJ as to
their policy on marijuana regulation make potential marijuana businesses
uncertain about the future.168 This poses yet another obstacle for marijuana
businesses in compliance with state law looking for a future in marijuana.
Black market businesses run by the cartels are used to operating under
illegal conditions and have established networks giving them an advantage
over businesses coming into an uncertain atmosphere. Marijuana
prosecution is also determined by the administration running the executive
164
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branch. The Obama administration and Attorney General Holder have
clearly been lenient with regard to enforcing marijuana policies. This does
not mean that the next administration will take the same approach. In order
to curb that potential, some concrete policies ought to be implemented to
prevent future prosecution by the federal government over states where
marijuana is legal.
A good place to start in terms of untangling the conflict between state and
federal law is to remove marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA. As a
Schedule I drug, marijuana remains a drug that is a high priority for the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which rejected a proposal in 2002 to
remove marijuana as a Schedule I drug.169 Despite evidence to the contrary,
the DEA asserts that marijuana maintains the characteristics necessary to be
classified as a Schedule I drug. 170 While some argue that it should be
removed off the CSA altogether, a more feasible solution in today’s split
political environment would be to lower it to a Schedule II or III drug so as
to lower its potential for being sought after by the DEA.171 In April 2014
Attorney General Holder stated that he would be willing to work with
Congress to “reschedule” marijuana and take it off the list of what the
government considers the most dangerous drugs. 172 By declassifying
marijuana as one of the most dangerous drugs, the federal government will
open up the way for legal marijuana businesses to operate without as much
fear of being intercepted by the DEA, which can also focus its resources on
targeting the more dangerous drug cartels.
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A possible solution to resolve the conflict between federal rules
outlawing marijuana use and states that have legalized its use would be to
create an exemption from federal enforcement in states that have legalized
it.173 As discussed above, the CSA places marijuana as a top priority for
federal drug enforcement, and an exemption such as this is another possible
solution for this uncertain dilemma.174 This collaborative effort would ease
tensions that may prevent individuals from starting a business out of fear
that the federal government may intervene in their operation. This too
would pave a way for legal marijuana businesses to more freely conduct
business, and, as a result, further trump cartel influence in the United States.
While the rescheduling of marijuana or the implementation of an
exception would have to come through Congress, it is also possible for the
president to implement an executive order to reschedule or create an
exception. Although executive orders face the risk of being overturned by
Congress, the US Supreme Court, or the next executive administration, they
tend to remain after they have been issued.175 Should President Obama issue
an executive order on this issue, it would serve as a movement forward in
protecting legal marijuana businesses, giving them more mobility to
eventually replace black market marijuana businesses.
D. The Other Side: Counterarguments
It is hard to determine exactly how US marijuana legalization would hurt
the cartels, in part because we do not have perfect numbers on how drug
traffickers profit from marijuana use in each of the 50 states.176 It is widely
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accepted that marijuana accounts for at least 50 percent of cartel profits, at
least for some cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel. 177 Assuming it were
legalized in the United States, that still leaves cartels with the 40 percent
profit they make from selling other drugs such as methamphetamine,
cocaine, brown powder, and heroine.178 That is why states that do legalize
marijuana need to carefully craft their legislation so as to maximize the
effects it has on cartels.
Supporters of strict licensing regulation argue that licensing is necessary
for purposes such as preventing criminals from being involved in the
marijuana business. While thorough background checks should be
implemented for this purpose, this purpose should not be used to justify a
limit on the number of licenses issued. Increases in the number of
applications granted will eventually allow for a replacement of black market
businesses. While background checks will certainly weed out certain
individuals, chances are that in the abundance of applicants, there are plenty
of applicants that will pass the background checks and can lawfully operate
a marijuana operation.
Some argue that extracting as much revenue as possible from taxes is
necessary to help fund public education, public works, or other public
institutions. While an increase in tax revenue is certainly helpful for state
economies, policy makers must consider that legal businesses still need to
compete with illegal businesses. In some cases, legal marijuana costs almost
twice as much as illegal marijuana. By increasing or eliminating caps on the
total amounts of marijuana that can be sold, states can lower the tax rate and
still receive a similar amount of tax revenue.
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Another argument against loosening marijuana regulation is to prevent
higher numbers of drug use. Although most should be able to agree that
decreased drug or marijuana use is always better than not, demand for it
will likely exist whether or not it is legal. This is exemplified by the fact
that it has increased in enormous popularity over the past 50 years while it
was illegal for most of that time and in most places. Also, the proposals
presented in this article are not meant to increase the overall usage of
marijuana, but rather to regulate its legal manufacture and distribution in
such a way that strategically ousts black market marijuana businesses.
It is clear that a movement to legalize and normalize marijuana use is
gaining traction in the United States, and by keeping marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, the federal government is only holding back the growth of
this movement. While many people take different stances as to why they do
or do not support the legalization of marijuana, the placement of marijuana
as a Schedule I drug seems counterintuitive and diverts federal attention
away from what many people agree are more dangerous drugs and drug
businesses. Policy makers must keep in mind that legal marijuana
businesses face the challenge of competing with the black market supplied
mostly by the Mexican cartels. The existence of the cartels has caused a
bloody war in Mexico that has cost tens of thousands of lives. Surely this
fact must strongly influence the minds of policy makers when thinking of
the best way to regulate marijuana.

V. CONCLUSION
Mexico is currently facing a grave challenge that threatens the
livelihoods of its citizens. In some locations, individuals cannot even walk
outside without fear of the violence that is currently strangling Mexico. The
drug cartels have risen as enormous forces that compete directly with each
other and with federal military forces. This has resulted in a bloody war that
has plagued Mexico for almost a decade.
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Fortunately, there is hope. The main supply of money for cartels is the
sales they make in the illegal marijuana market in the United States. States,
just like Washington, Colorado, and most recently, Oregon, Alaska, and the
District of Columbia are now beginning to legalize marijuana for
recreational use. Other states are hoping to follow in those footsteps by
doing the same in upcoming elections. However, legalizing its use and
placing tight regulations that prevent legal marijuana businesses from being
competitive with illegal businesses may keep the cartels in business and
continue to drag out the drug war. Because of this, any state that has
legalized or is planning to legalize recreational marijuana in the future must
consider policies that allow legal marijuana businesses to drive their illegal
counterparts out of business. This article advocates that such policies ought
to consider loosening their licensing requirements, reducing taxes on
recreational marijuana, increasing the amount of marijuana that can be sold,
and teasing out any potential state and federal tangles. Steps such as these
will hopefully lead to an end to the violence that has plagued Mexico for
almost a decade.
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